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LUTHER AND THE JUSTIFIABILITY OF 
RESISTANCE TO LEGITIMATE AUTHORITY 
BY CYNTHIA GRANT SHOENBERGER 
The works of Martin Luther and of other early Protestant writers 
are often completely neglected by students and scholars of political 
thought in this country. If his period is considered at all, Luther is 
generally dealt with cursorily, as a stepping-stone to Calvin and the 
Huguenots, essential to political and intellectual history but not very 
interesting in his own right. The impression frequently given is that 
Luther was a latter-day Augustine in his views of secular authority, 
endorsing its legitimacy for the Christian and counselling strict obedi- 
ence to the powers-that-be. 
One reason for this conclusion, which I contend is a mistaken one, 
is that the writings translated, collected, and anthologized for academic 
use are those which Luther wrote during the early years of his clash 
with the Roman church and the associated notion of a universal Chris- 
tendom represented by the Holy Roman Empire. Reading, for example, 
the 1523 work, Temporal Authority, the student finds that Luther was 
concerned to "provide a sound basis for the civil law and sword, so no 
one will doubt that it is in the world by God's will and ordinance."' 
The image of the political system which pervaded the work was of a 
hierarchical order of authorities established by God. Power flowed down- 
wards, and those in inferior positions were obligated to obey those set 
above them in the hierarchy. The implications for the possibility of 
resistance in Germany were clear: although the use of force might be 
permissible against an equal or inferior authority, a prince could never 
justly wage war against his overlord, the emperor.2 It went without say- 
ing that a private subject might never actively resist the authorities set 
over him, but Luther nonetheless allowed for the possibility of refusal 
to obey in cases when the prince trespassed upon the jurisdiction belong- 
ing of right only to God. Under such circumstances the Christian's two 
duties, to God and to his prince, might come into conflict; and the 
proper response to such a dilemma was that which Saint Augustine had 
prescribed-passive resistance, that is, to disobey but submit to what- 
ever punishment might be assigned for disobedience.3 
1 Luther, Temporal Authority: To What Extent it Should be Obeyed (1523), in 
Luther's Works (hereafter Works) (55 vols.; St. Louis and Philadelphia, 1955-75), 
XLV, 85. 
2 Ibid., 124-25. 3Ibid., 112. 
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What is often forgotten about Temporal Authority is that it was 
written out of Luther's concern about the excessive interference of the 
Catholic Church in secular affairs, during a period when he had not yet 
abandoned hope that the Emperor Charles V might support him in that 
concern. Like so many of Luther's writings, it was directed toward 
a particular situation; it was not intended to provide a definitive theory 
of political obligation. Moreover, the mistaken impression that Luther 
never condoned any form of active resistance is strengthened in the 
minds of political theorists by knowledge of his response to the outbreak 
of the Peasants War, when despite his original sympathy with their 
demands Luther issued a series of vituperous pamphlets4 encouraging 
the German princes to put down the rebellious peasants with all neces- 
sary means. The excessively bloody results, as well as the intemperate 
language used by Luther, entrenched the notion of him as an indis- 
criminate supporter of the government in power, however brutal. 
This fundamentally erroneous conclusion can be corrected only by 
tracing the evolution of Luther's thought on the subject of resistance 
beyond the early 1520s, through the period when the Protestant League 
of Schmalkalden was founded, and during the years of intense, though 
intermittent, hostilities preceding the 1547-51 war between the Em- 
peror Charles V and the evangelical cities and states. Luther himself 
died in 1546, before the outbreak of full-scale armed strife; but during 
the years when he felt his church to be imminently threatened, his 
opinion on active resistance to the Emperor underwent radical change. 
Since he was not a writer of elaborate theoretical Summae, the develop- 
ment of his thought on this issue can only be understood through ex- 
amination of his correspondence, public debates, and private conversa- 
tions, or Tischreden, as recorded by students who frequently dined in 
the Luther household. These materials are not easily accessible to the 
English reader, since they have by and large not been translated from 
the original archaic German and/or Latin, and are rarely included in 
the anthologies used by American students of political thought.5 
Luther's Early Position on Resistance 
Before turning to those later writings, it is very important to under- 
stand the situation Luther faced after his dramatic break with the 
Roman church in 1517. He was entirely dependent upon the protection 
4 For example, Admonition to Peace: A Reply to the Twelve Articles of the 
Peasants in Swabia (1525), in Works, XLVI, 17-43; Against the Robbing and Mur- 
dering Hordes of Peasants (1525), in Works, XLVI, 49-55; and An Open Letter 
on the Harsh Book against the Peasants (1525), in Works, XLVI, 63-85. 
5Although never included in the anthologies in common use, some of these 
materials are not inaccessible to the English reader who is a serious student of 
Luther, for a number are included in.the American edition of Luther's Works. 
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of the evangelical princes, and it was only through the intervention of 
the Elector Frederick of Saxony, who arranged for Luther to be kid- 
napped and placed under protective custody after his condemnation 
at the 1521 Diet of Worms, that he escaped capture and perhaps death 
by the forces of Emperor Charles V and Pope Leo X. Thus, despite 
the revolutionary individualistic overtones of his theology, with its 
proclamation of the priesthood of all believers, the validity of the indi- 
vidual conscience, and the church as a community of all the faithful, 
Luther did not wish to lose the support of the Protestant princes by 
arousing fears of a general popular rebellion. He urged that the Reform 
be carried out in an orderly fashion by the established authorities and 
warned against overzealous measures by the population at large, such as 
iconoclasm and the interruption of Masses.6 The use of violence in the 
service of Reform, he thought, resulted more frequently in harm than 
benefit and could succeed only in discrediting the Lutherans.7 Thus both 
political and pragmatic considerations led Luther at this time to oppose 
disruption of the established order. 
Such considerations were supported both by Luther's ethical con- 
victions and by factors of temperament. He was shocked and frightened 
by the disorders he witnessed during his brief secret visit from Wartburg 
Castle to Wittenberg in 1521, as well as by the anarchic conditions he 
observed en route in Thuringia.8 The deep distrust of spontaneous pop- 
ular activity evidenced in his letters from this period and in his pamph- 
lets about the Peasants War was deepened by an extreme personal fear 
of disorder. 
Luther had, as well, a strong tendency toward pacifism. The use of 
force, he thought, more often than not resulted in worse situations than 
those it was intended to remedy. From his examination of history he 
concluded that revolutions were rare that resulted in governments better 
than those overthrown and that no government could remain stable if its 
rulers were exposed to such dangers as tyrannicide.9 He thought accord- 
ingly that resistance was both fruitless and highly risky. 
Moreover, Luther remained obsessed by a theological concern 
which was based on his somewhat Augustinian, determinist view of his- 
tory. History being in God's hands, He would take care of His own; 
6 For example, Letter to the Princes of Saxony Concerning the Rebellious Spirit 
(1524), in Works, XL, 49-59; Against the Heavenly Prophets in the Matter of 
Images and Sacraments (1525), Pt. I, in Works, XL, 75-143; and Letters to the City 
Council of Danzig (May 5, 1525), in D. Martin Luthers Werke: Briefwechsel, here- 
after W. A. (Weimar Aufgabe) Briefe, (Weimar, 1930-48), III, 483-86. 
7 A Sincere Admonition by Martin Luther to all Christians to Guard against In- 
surrection and Rebellion (1522), in Works, XLV, 53-74. 
8 Ernest Schwiebert, Luther and his Times (St. Louis, 1950), 540. 
9 Whether Soldiers, Too, Can Be Saved (1526), Works, XLVI, 105-107, 112. 
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and any display of self-help might be interpreted as a declaration of 
lack of faith in Providence. In other words, Luther was convinced that 
any Christian who believed in such measures as tyrannicide, deposi- 
tion, and armed rebellion betrayed a fundamental lack of faith in God, 
who would Himself punish tyrants, alone, presumably by manipulating 
the diseases and natural disasters at his command, or through the use 
of human agents, such as foreign rulers. Even the tyrant's own subjects 
might serve as God's instruments, but Luther believed that they would 
be condemned for so doing.10 Thus no Christian concerned for his own 
soul would involve himself in resistance of any sort. 
In sum, then, Luther seems during this early period of his public 
life to have consistently opposed resistance, on several grounds. His 
concern at this time was, first of all, with strengthening the state, the 
instrument upon which he relied for reform of the church, against the 
secular power of the papacy. And the impression he received from the 
civil disturbances of this era confirmed his belief that a strong state was 
necessary to restrain the evil nature of man. If the masses were really 
as sinful and ignorant as they appeared to be, they were clearly in- 
capable of governing themselves. Moreover, if anarchic violence was 
just below the surface of civil society, the proclamation of any right of 
resistance, however limited, would be very dangerous. Thus Luther in- 
variably denied the justifiability of resistance. On the other hand, he 
never insisted upon unconditional obedience; and many of the theoreti- 
cal distinctions he espoused were to prove suggestive when a Lutheran 
theory of resistance was developed. His delineation of spheres of secular 
and spiritual authority, for example, provided a basis for ascertaining 
when resistance was to be undertaken. In addition, although Luther 
emphatically ruled out the possibility of resistance by private individu- 
als, the position of the magistrate involved the possibility of conflict. On 
the one hand, the German princes and lower magistrates were inferior 
in status to the Emperor; on the other, they as rulers had been charged 
by God with the protection of their subjects. Their intermediate position 
in the governmental hierarchy could thus place them in a moral quan- 
dary if the Emperor decided to attack their Protestant subjects. While 
Luther at this time decided that their obligation to the Emperor must 
take priority, other Lutherans concluded the opposite.'1 
10 Ibid., 109-110. 
1 I am greatly indebted to Richard Roy Benert, whose personal assistance and 
scholarship, "Inferior Magistrates in Sixteenth-Century Political and Legal Thought" 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of History, University of Minnesota, 
1964), directed my attention to many critical sources on the development of legal 
and theological arguments for resistance, as well as their acceptance by Melanchthon 
and, eventually, by Luther himself. 
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Luther's Reluctant "Conversion" 
From the early 1520s on, Luther was subjected to a great deal of 
pressure on the question of resistance. In 1523 the Elector Frederick of 
Saxony asked for his opinion as to "whether a prince might by war 
protect his subjects from persecution by the Emperor or other princes 
on account of their faith." Luther did not give him much encourage- 
ment, replying that the Elector should act only if his opponent were a 
prince of equal rank.1' The other theologians from whom opinions 
were sought at the same time, however, dissented somewhat from 
Luther's position; and these chinks in the Wittenberg front widened as 
the political situation grew worse. For example, Johannes Bugenhagen, 
a theologian close to Luther, answered in 1523 that a prince was re- 
quired to protect his subjects against injustice from whatever source, 
just as he would protect them against robbery or murder. As servants 
of the law, possessors of the sword, and protectors of their people, the 
princes thus had the right to resist the Emperor.13 By 1529 Bugenhagen 
had organized his thoughts on this subject into a lengthy treatise which 
he presented to the Elector, thus confirming the fact that there was con- 
siderable support among the theological faculty for resistance; the 
arguments in it were built around two fundamentally Lutheran con- 
cepts, the notion of spheres of secular and spiritual authority and the 
duty of the prince or magistrate to protect his subjects.14 
This increasing theological support, as well as the political situation, 
encouraged Saxony to participate in the negotiations over the formation 
of a defensive military alliance among the various Protestant cities and 
states. The politician most actively involved in this alliance project was 
Philip of Hesse, who carried on an active correspondence with the 
various evangelical princes and city councils in an attempt to gain their 
adherence to such a league. A series of war scares--the 1528 rumor 
that a Catholic league was preparing to attack Protestant strongholds, 
the withdrawal by the Emperor in 1529 of all past concessions to the 
Lutherans, and the failure of the 1530 Diet of Augsburg to resolve the 
continuing dispute-seemed to underline the extreme urgency behind 
Philip's efforts. 
12 Luther, Gutachten (for Elector Frederick of Saxony, shortly before Feb. 8, 
1523), in Heinz Scheible (ed.), Das Widerstandsrecht als Problem der deutschen 
Protestanten, 1523-1546, Vol. X of Texte zur Kirchen-und Theologiegeschichte, ed. 
Gerhard Ruhbach (Giitersloh, 1969), 17. 
13 Bugenhagen, in Scheible, 18. 
14 Bugenhagen, "Bedencken auff die Frage: ob man das Evangelium, wider den 
Keyser, mit dem Schwerdt schiitzen moge?" (to Elector John of Saxony, 1529), in 
Friedrich Hortleder, Handlungen und Ausschreiben . . . Von Rechtmdssigkeit, An- 
fang, Fort- und endlichen Ausgang des Teutschen Kriegs Keyser Karls dess funfften 
(2nd ed.; Gotha, 1645), II, 63-65. 
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Thus the anxiety of the Saxon Elector (in 1525 John had succeeded 
Frederick in that post) increased, and Luther's blessing was sought once 
again. But he still refused to approve participation in a league against 
the Emperor. The Protestant princes, Luther thought, would be justified 
in protecting their subjects against attack by equal-ranking princes, so 
long as they did not attack them pre-emptively. Such action would not 
qualify as resistance to higher authority. The problem, of course, was 
that the Catholic princes claimed that they were acting upon the Em- 
peror's command; and thus resistance to them had to be equated with 
resistance to the Emperor. Luther questioned this identification of the 
two authorities. The Catholic princes' plan, he charged, had been for- 
mulated without the Emperor's knowledge. Moreover, if they were 
claiming authority under the 1521 Edict of Worms, any such mandate 
was invalid, since it had been passed by a minority of the Estates and 
the right of appeal to the Emperor remained.15 
Luther's arguments were somewhat specious, but they allowed him 
to avoid coming to terms with the issue of resistance. The Edict of 
Worms had indeed been passed by a minority of the Estates, but only 
because many of the Protestant princes had voluntarily absented them- 
selves; and the result of an appeal to the Emperor seemed a foregone 
conclusion. Thus, although his contention allowed him to offer an affirm- 
ative answer to the specific question whether the Protestants might resist 
an attack by Catholic princes, it was clear that the real matter at issue, 
resistance to the Emperor, did not have his approval. This was the mes- 
sage conveyed to the Saxon Elector; and, in large part because of 
Luther's equivocal attitude on the question of resistance, the proposed 
alliance was not concluded at that time. 
But while Luther refused his support, the jurists in the employ of 
the Elector were beginning to marshal legal arguments in support of 
resistance. In response to Philip of Hesse's continuing pleas, a great 
debate, carried on through formal communiques and opinions, began 
among the lawyers and theologians attached to the courts and councils 
of the Protestant areas still in doubt over the justifiability of resistance 
to the Emperor; and out of this debate constitutional arguments for 
resistance began to be elaborated.16 These arguments, based upon a 
notion of the Empire as a limited monarchy, were an additional weapon 
15 To Gregory Briick, Chancellor of Electoral Saxony (March 28, 1528), W. A. 
Briefe, IV, 421-24. 
16 Hans Baron, in "Religion and Politics in the German Imperial Cities during 
the Reformation," English Historical Review, 12(1937), 406-413, describes the in- 
tense debate carried on in 1529 among representatives of the imperial cities which 
were evangelical and the Protestant princes, notably Philip of Hesse. Documents 
from this controversy are available in Scheible and in Hans von Schubert, Bekennt- 
nisbildung und Religionspolitik: 1529/30 (1524-1534) (Gotha, 1910). 
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for Philip of Hesse in his attempt to gain allies. He wrote, for example, 
to the Margrave of Brandenburg-Ansbach (who ultimately did not ad- 
here to the Schmalkaldic League) that the relationship between the 
Emperor and the inferior magistrates, a category used to include both 
the princes and city governments who held Electoral status under the 
terms of the 1356 Golden Bull and those who did not, was a conditional 
one. If the Emperor departed from his duty to abide by the terms of 
his election and to act according to standards of justice in dealing with 
the princes and cities, then the fundamental reason for which he had 
been elected, the maintenance of the laws, would vanish, and with it 
his authority. The obligation of the inferior magistrates to protect their 
subjects would remain, nonetheless; and they were bound to exercise it 
against a tyrannical Emperor, just as they would against the violent 
attack of the Turks.17 
Philip later elaborated upon these constitutional and legal arguments 
in a direct appeal to Luther himself. The nature of the German Empire 
was such, Philip said, that the Emperor was not only limited by funda- 
mental laws but also obligated to share this authority with the German 
princes. These princes had a unique status vis a vis the Emperor, one 
unparalleled in Scripture; their position had been described by one of 
the Schmalkaldic propagandists as collectively superior to that of the 
Emperor, since they had the right to elect him.'8 In any case, Philip 
argued, Charles V violated the agreement upon which his authority 
rested when he proceeded against any prince with force, when he failed 
to give a fair hearing to the Protestants' case, and when he acted with 
only the approval of a minority of the Estates in a matter which was 
clearly one for settlement by a Council.19 
As late as March 1530, however, Luther remained in agreement 
with the theologians and jurists who opposed resistance to the Emperor. 
Unless he were formally deposed by the Electors, he thought, the princes 
remained bound to obey him. They need not, indeed must not, co- 
operate with his designs; but actively to resist him in defense of their 
Protestant subjects was strictly forbidden.20 Thus Luther maintained 
his formal opposition to resistance throughout most of 1530; but, on the 
evidence of an anonymous opinion written at Wittenberg in the same 
year, many of his associates had already begun to accept constitutional 
17 Letter from Philip of Hesse to Margrave George of Brandenburg-Ansbach 
(Dec. 21, 1529), in Scheible, 44-46. 
18 "Ein Theologischer Rathschlag von Nirnberg: Dass nicht alle, sondern nur 
die ordentliche Gewalt von Gott. Unnd dass derowegen die Untere Obrigkeit im 
Reich wol befugt, wider die unordentliche Gewalt dess Obern in GlaubensSachen, 
ihre Underthanen zu schitzen," in Hortleder, II, 84-85. 
19 Philip of Hesse to Luther (Oct. 21, 1530), W. A. Briefe, V, 653-54. 
20 To Elector John of Saxony (Mar. 6, 1530), W. A. Briefe, V, 258-61. 
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arguments for resistance. Their conclusions seemed similar to those of 
Philip of Hesse. If the princes under German law were, as they described 
them, "pillars of the Empire," co-rulers with its head, and shared his 
responsibility to look after the welfare of the whole, then they were 
merely acting as executors of the German constitution in protecting 
their subjects against him, and not in their own interest.2' 
The pressures upon Luther culminated in the calling of a public 
disputation at Torgau in October and November 1530. The Elector 
John intended thereby to force the Wittenberg theologians into an open 
confrontation with the Saxon jurists and thus to obtain a definitive 
resolution of his ethical and legal dilemma. The legal experts presented 
their position first, insisting that the Emperor was elected upon specific 
conditions and was to rule in conjunction with the Estates. If he vio- 
lated the laws of the Empire, as he had done by proceeding against the 
Protestants when their appeal to a Council was still pending, all their 
obligations to him were erased.22 Relying heavily upon Roman and 
canon law, the lawyers asserted that the princes and estates might resist 
the Emperor in situations similar to those in which a private individual 
could lawfully disobey a judge and resist the execution of his sentence: 
when he made a ruling on a matter not within his jurisdiction; when he 
passed a sentence involving clear and irreparable injustice; and when 
the procedures for appeal were not respected. Analogously, the Emperor 
had attempted to execute his judgment in matters of religion, which did 
not fall within his jurisdiction; his decision was, in the Protestants' 
judgment, clearly wrong and involved irreparable damage in the possible 
loss of souls; and procedural law had been violated when the Emperor 
continued to execute his judgment while the appeals were still pending.23 
These arguments were very similar to those which have been de- 
scribed above and which Luther had already rejected, yet at Torgau they 
seem at last to have gained his acquiescence. In the name of all the 
Wittenberg theologians, Luther presented a brief opinion admitting that, 
although they had always preached nonresistance in the past, the theo- 
logians had not realized that the constitution of the Empire in fact pro- 
vided for resistance under certain circumstances: "For when we pre- 
viously taught, positively never to resist the established authority, we 
did not know that such a right was granted by the laws of that very 
authority, which we have at all times diligently instructed people to 
obey."24 Thus the pastors with this brief declaration essentially passed 
the question of resistance to the jurists. 
21 
"Ein Theologisches Bedencken," in Hortleder, II, 68. 
22 Gutachten der Kursichsischen Juristen (shortly before Oct. 26, 1530), in 
Scheible, 63-66. 23 Ibid. 
24 
"Erklirung Luthers, Jonas', Melanchthons, Spalatins und anderer Theologen 
und protokollarische Aufzeichnung fiber die weitern Voten der Theologen und 
Juristen" (Oct. 26-28, 1530), in Scheible, 67. Translation mine. 
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It is important to note that in voicing this new position Luther based 
his stand solely upon the cautious, tightly circumscribed grounds of 
constitutional law. Arguments based on natural law, more open and 
generalizable, he specifically rejected, although the jurists had mar- 
shalled them in support of their own opinion. In a letter to Lazarus 
Spengler in February 1531, Luther described how the jurists at Torgau 
had tried to get the theologians to agree to base resistance upon the 
principles that it was permitted to repel force with force (vim vi re- 
pellere licet) and that active resistance was permitted in cases of no- 
torious injury, both arguments ultimately based on the natural right 
of self-defense. Luther had refused to agree. The right to resist, he 
repeated, stemmed from the fact that the Emperor's own laws, which 
all must observe, required resistance in certain circumstances: 
Render unto the Emperor, what is the Emperor's. And it is the Emperor's 
right, that he must be resisted in matters of notorious injustice. . . . All that 
the Emperor has established, that is, the law of the Emperor, is to be ob- 
served. But that law determines, that one must resist him in such a case.25 
There are also indications in this and other letters from the same 
period that Luther had been extremely reluctant to embrace a pro- 
resistance position and that he continued to be so. In the letter to 
Spengler, as in one to Wenceslaus Link in January and to "a citizen 
of Ntirnberg" in March, he made references to his old opinions on re- 
sistance, implying that he still considered passivity to be the better 
course.26 Yet in each of these letters he also repeated what he had said 
to Spengler, that the law of the Empire seemed to allow resistance. The 
decision on whether any particular individual would undertake such a 
course, however, he left to the individual's own conscience, guided by 
the expert opinions of the lawyers. He himself would not offer counsel 
in one direction or the other. Thus he clearly did not regard his Torgau 
opinion as a call to arms, which could never provide an effective sub- 
stitute for trust in God. 
A similar attitude pervaded the "exhortation" which Luther finally 
produced in response to Philip of Hesse's request. The Warnung an 
seine lieben Deutschen was not, however, quite what Philip had in mind. 
In it Luther specifically disclaimed the intent to summon anyone to 
resistance, although he said that he did not condemn the kind of de- 
fensive war which he thought imminent.27 He directed his words not to 
the Protestants but to their potential opponents instead. It was the duty 
25Luther to Lazarus Spengler (Feb. 15, 1531), W. A. Briefe, VI, 37. Transla- 
tion mine. 
26 Luther to Wenceslaus Link (Jan. 15, 1531), W. A. Briefe, VI, 16-17, 56-57. 
27 W. A., XXX, iii, 278, 282-83. Luther's Warning has also been translated in 
the American edition of his Works; and the editors briefly discuss Luther's chang- 
ing attitude toward resistance and the political context in which this evolution was 
taking place (Works, XLVII, 5-9). 
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of all German Christians, he thought, to disobey the Emperor, who was 
acting "not only against God and divine law, but also against his own 
imperial laws, oaths, duty, seals, and letters" by, for example, seeking 
to condemn the Protestants without giving their case a fair hearing.28 
Private citizens should therefore refuse both to obey their Emperor and 
to participate in the war on his side. However, only those who had 
public authority to do so, and that seemed in the light of the jurists' 
arguments to include the princes, should actively oppose the Emperor.29 
Luther himself did not recommend any particular course of action, ex- 
cept to pray for aid and to hope for peace; but the impact of the 
Warnung was publicly to confirm his support, however cautious, for the 
Protestant princes' undertaking. 
Luther's Torgau "conversion" has been a source of considerable 
controversy among German scholars familiar with this period.30 Some 
have asserted that Luther's conclusion was virtually extorted from him 
by the Saxon Chancellor-an astonishing belief about a man who had 
stood up to Pope and Emperor with legendary courage. It is my opinion 
that Luther's change of heart was genuine, if somewhat grudging. He 
had indeed always preached obedience to the civil law, and primarily 
because he thought it embodied God's own will. Thus when his hier- 
archical image of the Empire collided with the jurists' contention that 
it was in fact an elective arrangement among rulers who were in many 
respects equal, he was compelled to acknowledge a constitutionally- 
based right to resist. The Christian, he believed, must follow the rules 
relevant to the sphere of activity in which he was engaged; and in this 
case it was not Luther but the jurists who were experts on those regu- 
lations. Different rules might apply in the Kingdom of God; but the 
Christian was not to be condemned when he did not follow them all 
here, even though he might thereby incur some sin. Sin, however, was 
an inevitable part of the human condition. 
In any case, the Lutheran politicians assumed from Torgau on that 
they had Luther's blessing. The withdrawal of his opposition removed 
the last obstacle to Saxon participation in Philip of Hesse's league, and 
it was concluded on February 27, 1531. This marked a significant turn- 
ing point. The league, over which so much debate had been spent, was 
28 W. A., XXX, iii, 291 284 ff. Translation mine. 29 Ibid., 299-30. 
30 For example, Karl Miller, Luthers Ausserungen iiber das Recht der bewag- 
neten Widerstands gegen den Kaiser, in Sitzungsberichte der k6niglichen bayerischen 
Akademie der Wissenschaften. phil.-hist. Klasse VIII (Munich, 1915), 43-45, 52 ff. 
and Pierre Mesnard, L'Essor de la Philosophie Politique an XVIe Siecle (Paris, 
1936), 228, both of whom feel that this opinion contradicts Luther's whole philoso- 
phy and that he had merely given in to the princes. For the opposing view, see 
Fritz Kern, "Luther und das Widerstandsrecht," Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung ffir 
Rechtsgeschichte, Kanonistische Abteilung, 6(1916), 336. 
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now a fact. Luther was far too loyal to the groups involved to challenge 
it, once in existence. In a treatise of the next year, he implored both 
sides to keep the peace; yet if he were to counsel the Lutherans not 
to arm themselves under the circumstances, he felt, it would be equiva- 
lent to serving as a Catholic propagandist. He would be sanctioning the 
vast advantage of the already heavily-armed imperial forces and sub- 
mitting his flock to the slaughter. The Protestants, he concluded, were 
merely defending themselves against those who would shed innocent 
blood; and the sin was upon the conscience of the Catholic forces.31 
Luther's Increasing Conviction during the 1530s and 1540s 
The best argument that Luther's "conversion" was indeed genuine is 
to be found in his correspondence and table talk of the years following 
the confrontation at Torgau. During this period, he remained convinced 
by the argument that resistance by the princes to the Emperor was 
constitutionally permissible; and his understanding of the imperial struc- 
ture became more sophisticated. Throughout the decade Luther re-- 
peatedly emphasized the limited and conditional nature of the Emperor's 
power in Germany, describing the government as "biirgerlich," one 
which, in contrast to an absolute monarchy, was circumscribed by legal 
relationships.32 The Emperor's power was strictly and specifically bound- 
ed by the obligations he had undertaken at his coronation: "He is sternly 
commanded and bound by his duties, yes, he has promised, vowed and 
sworn with his own oath, to administer justly the police, laws, rights, 
and orders of the Empire. . .."33 
By 1539 Luther's constitutional conception had become clearer and 
more elaborate. The Emperor's obligations, he thought, included not 
only the duty to uphold certain laws and procedures, but to share his 
authority with the other princes as well. In a February 1539 letter to a 
pastor in Cotbus giving advice about how to preach on the subject of 
resistance, he wrote that "the Emperor is not a monarch and cannot de- 
pose the electoral princes nor alter the form of the Empire."34 Hence, 
in Luther's opinion, the Emperor shared his power in many important 
respects with the German princes, making the Empire more an aristoc- 
racy than the monarchy Charles envisaged. This conception was in fact 
the subject of discussion at Luther's table the day before he wrote the 
letter just mentioned, and he very explicitly distinguished the position 
31 Wider den Meuchler zu Dresden (1531), W.A., XXX, iii, 456-57, 461. 
32 D. Martin Luthers Werke: Tischreden (hereafter W.A. Tischreden) II, 407 
(Aug.-Dec., 1531). 
33 W. A. Tischreden, I, 327 (first half of the 1530s). Translation mine. 
34 Luther an Joh. Ludicke, Prediger in Kottbus (Feb. 8, 1539), W. A. Briefe, 
VIII, 367. Translation mine. 
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of the Hapsburg Emperor in Germany from that of a king in other 
nations: 
Secondly, the Emperor is not a monarch in Germany as the kings of France 
and England are monarchs in their realms, but seven electors are at the same 
time members of the political body with the Emperor and are members of 
the Emperor; upon them also the care of the Empire is imposed, though 
not in the first instance. Thus the seven are equal in power with the Em- 
peror, although not equal in dignity.35 
The power of the electors, then, was equal to that of the Emperor, a 
situation Luther viewed as analogous to that of the rector of a univer- 
sity, who governed it in conjunction with his colleagues. The co-rulers 
served to moderate the Emperor; and they-and the other princes- 
might under certain circumstances resist him.36 In fact, whenever the 
Emperor acted flagrantly in contempt of the law, it became justified to 
resist him as a tyrant: "Thus when he violates these same laws and acts 
in contradiction of them, then we could justly resist him, as a tyrant, 
who exercises power and acts in opposition to his duty."37 This was the 
situation which Luther thought existed in Germany at that time, since 
the Emperor had ignored the appeal which was the constitutional right 
of the Protestant princes and had proceeded against them with force. 
A very likely source of Luther's newly developing image of the German 
Empire was his close associate Philip Melanchthon. As early as 1530, 
while characterizing different types of kingdoms in his Commentary on 
the Third Book of Aristotle's Politics, Melanchthon described the im- 
perial Electors in a way parallel to Luther's own later description: 
There is, therefore, another kind of kingdom, a supreme rule, but one quali- 
fied by an established law. Certain nations have supplemented their kings 
with guardians, who have the right of reproving the kings. Just as the 
Lacedaemonians added ephors . . . in Germany there are electors, in 
France there are certain princes of the parlement, who act as if they were 
the ephors of the kings.38 
The historical implications of the ephor argument were clear, and it 
seems highly likely that Melanchthon, always more the scholar, tutored 
Luther in them. 
In the early 1530s, moreover, Melanchthon also accepted natural 
law arguments for resistance, endorsing the right of self-defense in cases 
of "atrocious injury" and upholding the identity of natural and divine 
35 W. A. Tischreden, IV, 236-37 (Feb. 7, 1539). Translation mine. 
36 Ibid., 237. 
37 W. A. Tischreden, II, 407 (Aug.-Dec., 1531), Translation mine. 
38 Melanchthon, Philippi Melanthonis Opera quae supersunt omnia, ed. Karl 
Bretschneider and Heinrich E. Bindseil (28 vols:I-XXVIII of Corpus Reformatorum 
[hereafter CR]; Halle, 1834-1860), XVI, 440. Translation mine. 
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law.39 Melanchthon was thus readier than Luther at this time to embrace 
a natural law basis for resistance, and he emphasized it from then on 
far more than positive or constitutional law. His Prolegomena to Cicero's 
Offices, written in 1530, contained Melanchthon's clearest statement of 
both the natural law argument and the doctrine of resistance by inferior 
magistrates: 
Animals resist violence out of a natural instinct, for the instinct of self- 
preservation has been instilled by God in every nature; in man, however, 
two things lead to the resistance of unjust violence . . . [one is] the instinct 
for one's own preservation, the other thing is the notion, which teaches . . . 
that the human race is so established as to preserve equality. 
It is therefore a true saying, [that] nature permits the repelling of force with 
force, but natural knowledge teaches that this is to be understood in a 
special way: [namely, that] it is permitted to repel unjust force with author- 
ized force, clearly by the office of the magistrate, when it is possible to use 
his aid, or by one's own hand, in the absence of a magistrate .. .40 
Such a formulation prefigured a strand of thought which was to enter 
Lutheran discussion with increasing frequency during the 1530s and 
1540s and which was destined to become central to the evolving theory 
of resistance. If, indeed, all creatures had a divinely-instilled instinct of 
self-preservation, an impulse to defend themselves which was an in- 
eradicable part of their natures, then, almost by definition, resistance 
under conditions of self-defense could not but be justified. There might 
still be room to clarify the conditions under which it should take place; 
but resistance itself was nonetheless a natural right, in the most funda- 
mental and, in fact, extremely modern sense of that term. 
Natural law arguments-the concepts of "atrocious injury," of 
self-defense, and of the prince's duty to protect his subjects-had 
thus become crucial to Melanchthon's justification of resistance before 
Luther was willing to acknowledge any of them. Yet by the late 1530s 
many of these elements made their way into his thought as well. At 
first he began to support the idea, which he had specifically rejected in 
1530, that the territorial princes were obligated to resist the Emperor 
in defense of their subjects' souls, bodies, and possessions. In the Wit- 
tenberg theologians' third formal opinion, which Luther signed though 
he was not the author, the conclusion is drawn that "every prince is 
obligated therefore primarily to protect and to maintain the Christians 
and the true external service of God against all unjust power; as also 
39Melanchthon to Heinrich von Einsiedel (1532), in Johann Erhard Kapp, 
Kleine Nachlese einiger, grissten Theils noch ungedruckter und sonderlich zur 
Erlduterung der Reformations-Geschichte niitzlicher Urkunden (Leipzig, 1727), 
204. 
40 Prolegomena in Officia Ciceronis, CR, XVI, 573. Translation mine. 
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otherwise a prince is obligated in worldly things, to protect a virtuous 
subject against unjust force."41 The authors specifically included in this 
category resistance against the Emperor himself, even when he was 
acting with the proper authority, and implied that such action would be 
justified to protect subjects against both spiritual and worldly oppres- 
sion. Indeed, when the theologians reiterated this view in 1538, they 
made explicit that this was the case: 
It is our duty to watch over and defend [our subjects], if someone, the magis- 
trate or other, undertake to compel them to accept idolatry and the forbidden 
divine service. Likewise, if someone should undertake to exercise unjust 
power against their subjects.42 
What is most interesting about this 1538 opinion is that the right 
to resist in defense of certain values was openly related to natural law. 
The theologians drew a parallel between the right of a prince to defend 
his subjects and the right and duty under natural law to protect one's 
wife and children: 
Every father is obliged, according to his ability, to protect his wife and 
children against outright murder, and there is no difference between a private 
murderer and the Emperor when he undertakes [to exercise] unjust force 
outside of his office, and especially, open or notorious unjust force. For 
open violence annuls all duty between subjects and superiors according to 
natural law.43 
The jurists' argument based on the concept of notorious injury had thus 
been accepted; natural law was no longer shunned; and-what is more 
astonishing-resistance by a private individual seems to have been con- 
templated. 
Some Luther scholars make much of the fact that he was not the 
principal author of these later Wittenberg opinions, taking this as evi- 
dence that Luther never really abandoned his initial antipathy to re- 
sistance.44 It is quite true that Melanchthon was the most probable author 
of the Wittenberg proclamations of the 1530s, since they correspond so 
closely to his own position and to the specific formulations he had given 
it. Yet it is significant, at the least, that Luther was willing to add his 
name to the list of signatures; and owing to his prominence it always 
41 Luther, Jonas, Bugenhagen, Amsdorf, Cruciger, Melanchthon, Gutachten, for 
Elector John Frederick of Saxony (Dec. 6, 1536), in Scheible, 89-90. Translation 
mine. 
42 Luther, Jonas, Bucer, Melanchthon, Gutachten, for Elector John Frederick of 
Saxony and Landgrave Philip of Hesse (Nov. 13-14, 1538), in Scheible, 93. Trans- 
lation mine. 
43 Ibid. Translation mine. 
44 Scholars of this opinion include Muller, op. cit., 68, and Herman Doerries, 
"Luther und das Widerstandsrecht," Wort and Stunde, III (Gittingen, 1970), 240. 
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appeared first among the subscribers. For a man of great integrity, who 
insisted upon conviction over compromise, this willingness, in my mind, 
signified an underlying agreement. 
More important, one can trace the evolution of a similar view in 
the accounts of Luther's table talk from the early 1530s. The question 
whether one might defend oneself against a robber or murderer was dis- 
cussed repeatedly, and Luther's answer was always in the affirmative.45 
The reason was that, in the absence of a magistrate, the individual had 
the right to protect himself or others against the use of force; in fact, 
the individual was obliged to do so, since in such a case he represented 
the public authority and must uphold the political order on its behalf.46 
This view found its way into a public disputation in 1539: 
For just as the magistrate, of whom you are a member, himself resists in- 
justice, thus he commands and orders you also to resist unjust force . . . For 
you know that the magistrate has commanded and ordered [you] to resist 
murderers, and to protect his citizens and subjects.47 
The analogy drawn was to the right to resist the Emperor when he acted 
like a common robber or murderer, thereby losing the special authority 
he had over his subjects.48 This parallel was articulated by identifying 
it with some kind of collective self-defense: 
If, however, I caught someone, who was not exactly a tyrant, with my wife 
or daughter, so would I want to kill him. Likewise if he took by force from 
this one his wife, from another his daughter, from a third his field and goods, 
and the citizens and subjects came together, and could no longer tolerate or 
endure his violence and tyranny; so could they kill him just as they would 
another murderer or robber on the street.49 
Thus many individuals who had been wronged in similar ways might 
organize to exercise together the right of defense which they all possessed 
individually, and rid themselves of the tyrannical magistrate. 
Working in this way from a double analogy-the parallel rght of 
individuals and magistrates to protect "their own50" and the similarity 
between a robber-murderer and the tyrannical Emperor-Luther con- 
cluded with a definite hint that resistance might be offered by individuals 
in the last resort. The individual, unlike his magistrate, could only resist 
in defense of himself or of those in his care, and not on behalf of his 
faith,5' but the two might well become assimilated in the case of a re- 
ligious war: 
45 For example, W. A. Tischreden, II, 224-25 (Sept. 20-Oct. 21, 1532). 
46 Ibid., II, 406 (Aug.-Dec., 1531); IV, 237 (Feb. 7, 1539). 
47 Luther, "Etliche Schluss-reden," Hortleder, II, 98. Translation mine. 
48 W. A. Tischreden, I, 326-27 (first half of the 1530s). 
49 Ibid., I, 558-59 (first half of the 1530s). Translation mine. 
50 Ibid., III, 631-32 (Apr. 3, 1538); IV, 308-310 (Mar. 21, 1539). 
51 Ibid., II, 224-25 (Sept. 20-Oct. 21, 1532); II, 406 (Aug.-Dec., 1531). 
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This is not a theological matter but a legal one. If the emperor undertakes 
war he will be a tyrant and will oppose our ministry and religion and then 
he will also oppose our civil and domestic life. Here there is no question 
whether it's permissible to fight for one's faith. On the contrary, it's necessary 
to fight for one's children and family.52 
By the end of the 1530s, a situation under which such resistance 
might be permitted, or even required, seemed to have arrived. After 
nearly a decade of relative peace following the war scare of 1530, the 
atmosphere again became highly charged. Charles V appeared ready to 
attack the Lutherans by 1539; and the Protestants, under the leadership 
of Philip of Hesse, were determined to resist forcibly. Luther's personal 
outlook became increasingly apocalyptic. He no longer saw the conflict as 
one between two levels of government but as a battle in the last great 
clash between Christ's representatives on earth and the devil. The Pope 
was Antichrist and the Emperor his agent; and as such he could justly 
be resisted: 
Thus as it is just now to fight against the Turk in order to defend oneself, 
how much more is it now right to fight against the Pope, who is much worse 
than the Turks... . . Thus we shall judge the Emperor in this case not to be 
the Emperor, but a soldier and mercenary of the Pope.53 
It may seem that Luther was hereby attempting again to avoid the 
generalized question of resistance, and in a sense he was. If the times 
were extreme-the final days, perhaps-then such a defense of re- 
sistance could hardly be applied to more ordinary circumstances. In 
continuing to depict the Emperor as a mere instrument of the Pope, 
moreover, rather than as an independent political actor, Luther can be 
interpreted as merely reasserting the necessity to resist the intervention 
of the Roman hierarchy in temporal affairs. As the Emperor's inde- 
pendent personality was thus submerged in his role as an agent of the 
Pope, Luther began to conclude that anyone, private persons included, 
could resist him without awaiting any formal judgment or condemna- 
tion.54 This contention clearly went far beyond anything that Luther had 
been willing to accept up to that time. 
Under crisis conditions, Philip of Hesse and the Elector of Saxony 
arranged yet another public disputation on the right to resist the Em 
peror; it was held in April and May 1539, with Luther participating. 
The most important new distinction to emerge from this debate was 
Luther's concept of the "Beerwolf," who, in contrast to a mere tyrant, not 
only broke the law but also overturned the entire moral order upon which 
52 Ibid., III, 631-32 (Apr. 3, 1538). Translation mine. 
53 Luther an Joh. Ludicke, Prediger in Kottbus (Feb. 8, 1539), W. A. Briefe, 
VIII, 367. Translation mine. 
54 "Etliche Schluss-reden," Hortleder, II, 97-98. 
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it was based. All the subjects of such a ruler, and not just the inferior 
magistrates, had the right to resist and even to kill him and all his sup- 
porters.55 The point, of course, was that Luther thought the Emperor 
and the Pope were just such apocalyptic tyrants, and that the present 
situation justified all efforts to resist them. 
To conclude then: having started from a position of complete opposi- 
tion to resistance of any kind, Luther came eventually to embrace a no- 
tion of resistance based on constitutional and positive law and finally 
even on natural law. He did tend to describe each of the contingencies 
in which he justified resistance as a strategic exception to an underlying 
belief in non-resistance, either as a violation of the unique structure of 
the German Empire or as applicable by definition only to a very special 
and extreme case. Luther's reluctance and great caution on this issue 
were evident; and he was always torn between a perfectionist ethic and 
the necessity of acting in a world in which the existence of his church was 
endangered by the intentions of the Emperor, the Pope, and Catholic 
princes. Lack of faith in the use of force intensified his caution. Certainly 
forcible resistance was meant to be a last resort and even then to be 
exercised in a carefully circumscribed manner; but it is significant that 
each time his church was in peril during the 1530s and 1540s, Luther 
did on one or another ground allow the possibility of resistance. 
Moreover, Luther's pronouncements upon this issue were interpreted 
by Protestants in the years after his death as evidence that the initiator 
of the Reform had sanctioned resistance. In 1546, for example, his 1530 
Warnung an seine lieben Deutschen was republished with a preface by 
Melanchthon; and it and the tract Wider den Meuchler zu Dresden were 
cited by the Lutherans who led the city of Magdeburg's famous year-long 
defiance of the Emperor in 1550.56 In addition, his 1539 letter to Lubeck 
of Cotbus and the "Etliche Schliiss-Reden" (the relevant theses from the 
1539 disputation) were both updated and republished as publicity for 
the Schmalkaldic League in 1547.57 
Even more important, the writings of Luther and his associates, such 
as Bugenhagen, Melanchthon, the pastors at Magdeburg, the Protestant 
jurists and princes, had an influence far beyond the narrow issues of the 
Schmalkaldic War, as they were read by and influenced Protestants in 
France, Holland, and the British Isles.58 Luther, it is true, for political 
55 W.A., XXXIX, ii, 41-42. 
56 Bekenntnis Unterricht und Vermanung der Pfarrhern und Prediger der Christ- 
lichen Kirchen zu Magdeburgk (Magdeburg, Apr. 13, 1550), Pt. II. 
57 Oscar Waldeck, "Die Publizistik des Schmalkaldischen Krieges I," Archiv fir 
Reformationsgeschichte, 7(1909-1910), 40-42. 
58 For example, Irmgard Hoss, "Zur Genesis der Widerstandslehre Bezas," 
Archiv fir Reformationsgeschichte, 54(1963), 198-214; Robert M. Kingdon, "The 
Political Resistance of the Calvinists in France and the Low Countries," Church 
History, 27(Sept., 1958), 220-33. 
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as well as temperamental reasons, shied away from the democratic im- 
plications of many resistance theories, upholding the right of the princes 
to resist the Emperor but denying a similar right to the princes' subjects. 
The constitutional framework of the German Empire, in which the 
princes were concerned with asserting their autonomy vis a vis the cross- 
national political structure of the Middle Ages, made this limited argu- 
ment possible; but in France such a legal situation did not exist. Hugue- 
not writers-Francis Hotman, Theodore Beza, and the author of the 
Vindiciae Contra Tyrannos-were interested rather in establishing the 
right of "popular" representatives, such as the Estates or parlements, to 
control succession to the French throne and to approve new legislation 
and taxation.59 Thus the element of popular sovereignty, which had been 
present in inchoate medieval notions of resistance, was reintroduced by 
the French writers, with their theories of an elective and limited mon- 
archy based upon an original contract and depending upon the continu- 
ing approval of such popular representatives. Yet when they turned to 
the question of resistance, the Huguenots drew very heavily upon legal 
and theoretical justifications which had already been elaborated by the 
Lutherans. 
It is true that the Lutherans themselves had drawn upon the medieval 
formulations sketched out by Roman and canon lawyers, as well as upon 
scholastic sources. The German Protestants, however, then elaborated 
these notions and applied them to the situation of a Protestant minority 
being oppressed by a Catholic superior. Thus they provided arguments 
on behalf of resistance in a form especially relevant to the predicament of 
the Calvinists, who then recombined them with the medieval tradition in 
a particularly revolutionary fashion. 
This analysis of the evolution of the modern theory of resistance 
assigns to the Lutherans, therefore, a pivotal role, which has not usually 
been recognized. At the very least, it is clear that Luther himself was 
not unalterably opposed to the notion that legitimate yet oppressive 
political authority might be resisted. Hence Lutherans do not share a 
heritage of submissiveness to the powers-that-be. On the contrary, in an 
important sense the early modern theory of resistance underwent sig- 
nificant development on German soil; and, despite the fact that many of 
his own notions were derived from the arguments of others, a key figure 
in the development of resistance theory, owing to his vast moral influence, 
was Martin Luther. 
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